As an Nkrumahist (someone who believes in President Nkrumah’s positive nation-building ideas, and takes his warnings about the threat posed to Africa’s economic independence by neocolonialism, seriously), one is constantly wary of those in Africa whose narrow-mindedness and secret tribal-supremacist goals make them threats to national cohesion, wherever in the continent they hail from.
It is no secret that Ghana has its own small but powerful groups of tribal-supremacists in all the ethnic groups in the ten regions of our nation. We must never allow them to succeed in their aims. Ever.
The tragedy for Mother Ghana, is that that backward and arrogant lot have successfully cloaked their dark-ages world-views (full of hateful stereotypical-prejudices) by sucesssfuly wrapping themselves up with the flags-of-convenience of political parties.
All that loud “My-party-my-tribe-right-or-wrong” nonsense, which is often bandied about whenever regime-change occurs after elections in this dear nation of ours, and the attendant violence that is its handmaiden and manifestation on the ground (in the many acts of lawlessness and violence we see across Ghana), results directly from the insidious and nation-wrecking miasma that tribalism represents.
That is why Ghanaians of good conscience and goodwill – irrespective of their political backgrounds – must encourage President Akufo-Addo to demand that the law enforcement agencies deal firmly and ruthlessly with all those who think that somehow they are above our nation’s laws, and can therefore take the law into their hands at will, with total impunity. They are not.
After all, this is a nation of laws in which the rule of law is said to prevail, is it not? Haaba.
If we continue to allow such violent and lawless characters to rampage
across Ghana, they will eventually end up like Nigeria’s Boko Haram –
and attempt to mount a rebellion to enable them take full control of
the Republic of Ghana and terrorise all of us in the process.
The private militias of the two biggest political parties in Ghana, the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the largest opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), must be disbanded swiftly and banned permanently. They are a clear and present danger to Ghanaian democracy, to the long-term well-being of our country, and to national cohesion.
Today, we have culled and posted an article about South Sudan’s vampire-elites by Alex de Waal, entitled, “South Sudan’s corrupt elite have driven a debt-free and oil-rich country to ruin”. It shows how conflict amongst an irresponsible and greedy ruling elite has fuelled the tribalism and lawlessness, which has turned the lives of millions of ordinary South Sudanese citizens upside down.
We do hope it will make ordinary Ghanaians, particularly our talented and hardworking younger generations, realise the danger our nation faces if the creeping lawlessness throughout Ghana isn’t brought to an end soon. We could end up like South Sudan if the lawlessness continues unabated and remains unchecked by the law enforcement agencies. Hmm…
Please read on:
“International Business Times UK
South Sudan’s corrupt elite have driven a debt-free and oil-rich country to ruin In just five years the young African country has gone from prosperity to poverty.
By Alex de Waal
Updated July 15, 2016 16:47 BST
A man from Dinka tribe holds his AK 47 rifle in front of cows in a Dinka cattle herders camp near Rumbek, capital of the Lakes State in central South Sudan in this file picture from December 2013 Reuters
South Sudan gained independence in 2011 as a middle-income country. It was debt-free and enjoyed per capita spending many times greater than any of its East African neighbours. But 98% of government revenue was from oil, and therein lay the seeds of disaster.
The explanation of South Sudan’s precipitous collapse is that the elite − and especially the army − were living beyond their means. Five years ago, the country was selling 300,000 barrels of oil per day at about $100 a barrel. Today’s production is barely half of that, and once it pays pipeline tariffs plus interest on debts to the oil companies, the government gets almost nothing.
This collapse started early: just six months after independence, in January 2012, the government shut down its entire oil production in a dispute with (northern) Sudan over pipeline charges, which led to a brief border war three months later. When oil production re-started in mid-2013, the country was deep in an economic crisis from which it has not recovered.
At independence, more than half of the total budget was spent on the army, with salaries and allowances for the bloated military as much as 80% of that bill. The army was essentially a constellation of ethnic militias, each loyal to its particular commander-cum-paymaster. It was exempt from austerity measures imposed after the oil shutdown − not because it was needed for national defence, but because the 700 generals had sufficient clout to hold President Salva Kiir to ransom, with ill-concealed threats should they not be paid.
President Kiir’s strategy for remaining on top of his diverse, fractious and quarrelsome generals, and other members of a kleptocratic elite, was a ‘big tent’ policy: he paid them all off by allowing them to steal from state coffers. Vast sums of oil money disappeared into private pockets, or were recycled lower down the food chain into patronage payoffs.
The smaller-scale symptoms of the crisis are just as alarming as the organised fighting.
When the funds dried up, Kiir could no longer manage political rivalries, and couldn’t hold off the challenge of his own vice president, Riek Machar, for leadership of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which automatically translates into the presidency of the country. And when the crisis erupted in December 2013, the army split along ethnic lines. Why advertise with us
After nearly two years of fighting and atrocities against the civilian population, the international community arm-twisted President Kiir and his rival Machar, now heading the SPLM-in-opposition, into signing a peace deal. The basic flaw of this agreement was that it returned the political situation to the status quo ante just before the outbreak of fighting. It did not solve the political crisis or resolve the question of who should lead the SPLM, merely postponing the date of elections to 2018.